This paper investigates the sequential announcement of domestic emissions caps by regulators in a federal or international-based tradable pollution permit market for a transboundary pollutant. A leader-follower framework is used to analyse the consequences of regulators sequentially announcing domestic allocation caps. We …nd the sequential choice of domestic allocation caps is sub-optimal and depends on the follower's reaction to the leader's choice. Furthermore, the marginal damage and the degree to which allocations are substitutes or complements a¤ects whether the leader changes from being a net permit buyer (seller) of permits to a seller (buyer).
Introduction
The fundamental idea behind tradable pollution permit markets allows one regulator the ability to create and allocate pollution rights to …rms. Due to the competitive trading of permits in the market, the pollutant can normally be controlled e¢ ciently-where abatement e¤orts are e¢ ciently distributed among …rms (Coase 1960; Montgomery 1972) . In contrast to this simple theory, many current tradable permit markets span many regulatory bodies, such as schemes that control pollution over multiple states or countries (see, for example, Ellerman et al. 2000; Ellerman et al. 2007 ). Due to this phenomenon, an active debate has begun to focus on the strategic issues that arise when tradable permit markets are controlled by multiple regulators. As Helm (2003) has shown, allowing multiple regulators to simultaneously determine a proportion of the aggregate emissions cap results in strategic behaviour that can increase aggregate emissions above the socially optimal level of emissions. Yet, the timing of regulators'allocation choices has often been ignored.
In particular, there has been no discussion on the consequences of allowing regulators to sequentially announce emissions caps. Therefore, it is the aim of this paper to consider regulators' optimal behaviour and the social optimality of a tradable permit market when multiple regulators are allowed to sequentially announce their own (domestic) emissions caps.
In this paper, we investigate the a¤ects on a federal or international-based tradable pollution permit market when the level of permit allocation is determined by multiple regulators. The model is split into two stages: In the …rst stage, two regulators sequentially announce a level of pollution permits (domestic emissions cap) for …rms under their jurisdiction (i.e. in their geographical area). In the second stage, all …rms obtain a permit allocation (determined in stage one) and decide on a level of emissions to pollute in the perfectly competitive tradable permit market. We …nd that the sequential determination of regional emissions caps are socially suboptimal. When the follower's choice of emissions cap is complementary ("weakly" substitutable) the equilibrium level of aggregate allocation is closer too (further from) the socially optimal level. If the choice of emissions cap is "strongly" substitutable the equilibrium level of aggregate allocation is smaller than the socially optimal level. Furthermore, the extent to which the follower's allocation choice changes a¤ects whether the leader is a net buyer or seller of permits. Our model is also reduced to consider a special case, where both regulators simultaneously announce their emissions caps.
In existing tradable permit markets, it is increasingly common for multiple regulators to participate in the development of market trading rules, allocation selection and monitoring of participating …rms. For example, the U.S. "Acid Rain" program consists of numerous state regulators within a federal-based tradable permit market. It is possible that such a design may lead to state-level regulators behaving strategically (such as the strategic use of penalties and enforcement rules) in order to maximise their welfare (Santore et al. 2001) . It is also a common occurrence in the "new wave" of tradable permit markets, such as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) that aim to control CO 2 emissions in ten Northeastern US states and 27 EU Member States, respectively (Burtraw et al. 2005; Ellerman et al. 2007 ). The clearest example of strategic interaction exists between Member State regulators (governments) in the EU-ETS. Each Member State, through submission of their National Allocation Plan (NAP), has, among others things, the right to determine the composition and level of their allowance allocation-albeit with the approval of the European Commission (Ellerman et al. 2007 ).
The theoretical discussions of strategic behaviour in environmental policy have been extensively investigated (see, for example, Barrett 1994; Silva and Caplan 1997; Ulph 1996; 2000; Santore et al. 2001) . A large part of the literature discusses the incentives for governments to act strategically in product markets with transboundary pollution (see Barrett (1994) for an overview). Another aspect of the literature, 3 and closer in topic to this paper, focuses on the strategic action of federal states (or governments). Silva and Caplan (1997) investigate the e¤ectiveness of federal environmental policy in which regional and central governments were modelled to be both leaders and followers and …nd when the central government lead environmental policy, transboundary pollution is larger than the socially optimal level. However, when the regional government is selected as the leader and the central government provides incentives for e¢ cient decentralised behaviour, it is shown to be socially optimal. Very few studies have attempted to investigate strategic environmental policy in tradable permit markets. Santore et al. (2001) examine a federal-based model to investigate the incentives for US states to a¤ect the SO 2 market and show that states do have an incentive to intervene in the SO 2 permit market (through pollution penalties) and the outcome, in general, is Pareto ine¢ cient.
Two studies closest to our argument are Helm (2003) and D'Amato and Valentini (2006) . Helm (2003) considers an international tradable permit market with n non-cooperative countries and uses a two stage game where in the …rst stage, each country simultaneously selects a level of emissions for its representative …rm. Then, in stage two, the …rm from each country takes the governments allocation as given and selects a level of emissions to pollute. Helm (2003) …nds, that the introduction of trading actually increases the level of aggregate emissions where "more environmental concerned" countries choose less permits but this is o¤set by the selection of more permits from the "less environmentally concerned" countries. However, Helm's (2003) study is restricted to only simultaneous moves between governments.
We use a similar framework to Helm (2003) in that we have a two stage game but allow for the possibility of sequential announcements. D' Amato and Valentini (2006) extend the results of Helm (2003) by including a perfectly competitive product market and provide theoretical evidence for "excessive" allocation choices in the European Emissions Trading Scheme and are able to obtain the social optimality of a simultaneous-moves game with two regulators. However, our focus is on the social optimality of sequentially allocating domestic caps in an international or federal tradable permit market. Our paper is su¢ ciently general to allow the …ndings of Helm (2003) and D'Amato and Valentini (2006) to appear as special cases of our model.
Both studies give rigorous accounts of the incentives associated with multiple regulators (governments) simultaneously selecting domestic allocation caps but ignore the consequences of sequential selection. The interactions described by Helm With the sequential announcement of NAPs occurring, it has been suggested by Harrison and Radov (2007, pp 41-61) that the …rst published draft NAP, announced by the UK, was "one of the most in ‡uential of the twenty-…ve Member State plans developed to implement the EU-ETS" as it was "viewed by some commentators as an attempt to in ‡uence the development of NAPs in other Member States". Furthermore, it was apparent that "[s]ome member states may in fact have delayed noti…cation of plans...not merely for technical reasons, but also to see what standard the Commission would apply" (Zapfel 2007, p25) .
Such anecdotal evidence of sequential allocation announcements suggests that strategic behaviour may play a role in Member States'choice of permit allocations.
If so, it is important to consider whether the sequential announcement of domestic emission caps (and the additional information obtained) has any consequence for optimal allocation setting and social optimality. While our analysis is motivated by the EU-ETS, our model is su¢ ciently general to discuss federal or other international-based tradable permit markets.
A unique aspect of our model is the sequential announcement of regulators'domestic emissions caps. The above literature on international and federal-based tradable permit markets ignores the possibility that regulators may be able to announce their choice of domestic emissions caps at di¤erent time periods. Bárcena-Ruiz (2006) investigates whether governments prefer to be leaders or followers when implementing pollution taxes and …nds the degree to which they prefer to lead depends on the extent to which the pollution "spills over" to the other government. However, unlike our paper, Bárcena-Ruiz (2006) does not consider a tradable permit market.
In our simple sequential model, we allow one regulator to announce their domestic allocation cap …rst, that is, become the leader. Then, after observing this action, the remaining regulator (the follower) decides on an appropriate domestic allocation cap. After both regulators have decided on a domestic allocation cap, the permits are then simultaneously distributed to participating …rms in the tradable permit market. We …nd the sequential announcement of permits is socially sub-optimal.
Aggregate emissions are chosen further from (closer too) the socially optimal level compared to the simultaneous case when the follower's domestic allocation cap is "weakly" substitutable (complementary). In certain circumstances it is possible for the leader to change from a net supplier (buyer) of permits to a net buyer (supplier).
The paper is organised as follows: In Section 2 the basic model and the socially optimal case are discussed. In Section 3 the sequential announcement of permit allocations is discussed. We then illustrate the special case of simultaneous allocation setting. In Section 4 the simultaneous and sequential allocations are compared and …nally Section 5 has some concluding remarks.
2 The Basic Model
Consider a tradable permit market for a transboundary pollutant where there are two distinct regulators (or governments) k = i, j. 1 Each regulator has, under their jurisdiction, one representative polluting …rm in their geographical region, which we denote as …rm k = i, j. It is the responsibility of both regulators to select a domestic emissions cap that is allocated to their representative …rm. 2 The aggregation of the two domestic emissions caps determines the aggregate supply of permits in the perfectly competitive permit market. Furthermore, both …rms can freely trade permits between the two regions.
Our model is similar in framework to Helm (2003) where the game is split into two stages. In stage one, regulators sequentially announce a domestic emissions cap a k 2 R + for k = i, j, to be allocated to their representative …rm in order to maximise welfare in their jurisdiction. Without loss of generality, we assume that regulator i announces an emissions cap …rst (the leader). Regulator j (the follower), observes regulator i's decision, and using this information, announces an emissions cap.
In stage two, the domestic emissions caps from stage one are simultaneously distributed to …rms participating in the perfectly competitive tradable permit market.
Firms take the initial allocation as given and select a level of emissions to pollute e k 2 R + for k = i, j. To coincide with permit allocation procedures in many existing tradable permit markets, such as the EU-ETS, we ignore the possibility that participating …rms in the market obtain permits at di¤erent time periods. Instead, all regulators distribute their chosen permit allocation to …rms at one designated time period.
In order to …nd the subgame Nash equilibrium of this game, we use backward 1 In this paper, the use of the term "regulator" and "government" are interchangeable as their main task-the announcement of domestic emissions caps-is identical. For tractable simplicity, we assume throughout that no other regulatory in ‡uence exists other than the two regulators involved in announcing domestic emissions caps. 2 We assume throughout that the tradable permit market rules, such as rules on enforcement and monitoring, have been unanimously agreed by the regulators before the market is operational. induction by …rst solving the optimal strategy of each …rm (stage two) and then the regulators'optimal choice of permit allocation (stage one).
Stage Two: Firms'Emissions Choices
In stage two, the perfectly competitive tradable permit market commences with the distribution of domestic emissions caps to participating …rms (which was determined by regulators in stage one). In the tradable permit market, …rm k = i; j takes the equilibrium permit market price p and the allocation from its respective regulator a k , as given. Firm k selects a level of emissions e k for k = i; j to maximise (minimise) pro…t (cost) from the tradable permit market where the cost of abatement for …rm k is given by c
Equation (1) shows …rms'payo¤ from the permit market consisting of the revenue (cost) created by selling (buying) permits and the cost of abatement. Di¤erentiating equation (1) with respect to e k gives the …rst order condition for …rm k: @c k (e k ) @e k p = 0 for k = i; j (2) and the equilibrium market clearing condition is:
where e k is the equilibrium level of emissions for …rm k = i; j and a is the total permit supply across both regions. Equation (2) is the standard result of a perfectly competitive tradable permit market. Both …rms choose a level of emissions so that their marginal abatement cost is equated to the market equilibrium permit price and as a consequence abatement e¤ort is e¢ ciently distributed between …rms. Equation
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(3) is the equilibrium market clearing condition where the total amount of pollution emitted equals the aggregate supply of permits in the tradable permit market. To determine the responsiveness of the equilibrium permit price to aggregate allocation, we di¤erentiate (2) with respect p :
and di¤erentiate (3) with respect to a k :
By substituting (4) into (5) we obtain:
From equation (6), and the assumptions about the second derivative of the pollution abatement cost function, it is clear that as the level of aggregate emissions cap a increases, the permit price decreases. We now consider the optimal behaviour of regulators in stage one.
Stage One: Regulators' Choice of Domestic Emissions Cap
In stage one, regulators sequentially announce a domestic emissions cap for their representative …rm in order to maximise social welfare in their region. 3 Regulators have perfect knowledge of their …rm's reaction in stage two. In particular, regulators understand that the equilibrium permit price and the level of emissions chosen by …rms are dependent on the aggregate level of permits in the market, that is p = p (a) and e k = e k (a) for k = i; j where a is the regulators' aggregate supply of permits to the market (a a i + a j ).
The welfare of regulator k consists of net pro…t from its polluting …rm minus the damage associated with the total level of emissions in its jurisdiction. We assume the pollutant is transboundary so that pollution from both …rms cause damages to both
In equilibrium, as the aggregate level of emissions must equal the aggregate permit allocation, it follows from (3) 
Henceforth, we represent regulator k's damage function by D k (a). We allow the damage experienced by both regulators to be asymmetric in that D i (a) 6 = D j (a).
Formally, the objective function of regulator k is:
where e i , p are the equilibrium level of emissions and permit price determined by equations (2) and (3), respectively.
In the sequential announcement game, regulator i moves …rst (the leader) by announcing a level of permit allocation. Given this information, regulator j (the follower) selects a level of permit allocation. The sequence of play is common knowledge to both regulators. It follows, then, that the di¤erence in regulators'objective functions occurs as a result of the timing of decisions.
Regulator j, the follower, takes as given, the leader's choice of allocation. Therefore, regulator j assumes the aggregate emissions cap a is:
Using backward induction, regulator i, the leader, has perfect knowledge of the reaction of regulator j and understands its choice of allocation will alter the total allocation of permits, both directly (through its own choice of allocation) and indirectly (through regulator j's reaction to the leader's choice of allocation). As a consequence, the leader understands that the total allocation in the market is:
We show later in this paper that a special case of the model allows a game where both regulators announce allocations simultaneously, that is, both regulators are Cournot followers.
Socially Optimal Level of Allocation
To aid comparisons throughout the paper, we identify the socially optimal outcome for a centralised planner.
The centralised planner aims to simultaneously choose a domestic emissions cap for both regions. The social planner's objective function is to maximise the sum of regulators'welfare functions:
which, given (7) and (8), is:
Di¤erentiating equation (11) with respect to a i and a j respectively, gives:
p 0 (a) (a i e i (a)) + p (a)(1 e 0 i (a)) + p 0 (a) (a j e j (a))
p (a)e 0 j (a) c 0 i (e i (a)) c 0 j (e j (a)) @D i @a @a @a i @D j @a @a @a i and p 0 (a) (a j e j (a)) + p (a)(1 e 0 j (a)) + p 0 (a) (a i e i (a)) (13) p (a)e 0 i (a) c 0 j (e j (a)) c 0 i (e i (a)) @D i @a @a @a j @D j @a @a @a j where c 0 i (e i (a)) = @c i @ei @e i @p @p @a @a @a k , c 0 j (e j (a)) = @c j @ej @e j @p @p @a @a @a k , e 0 i (a) = @e i @p @p @a @a @a k , e 0 j (a) = @e j @p @p @a @a @a k , p 0 (a) = @p @a @a @a k and @a @a k = 1 for k = i; j. Equations (12) and (13) can be simpli…ed by noting that, in equilibrium, the market clears so that (a i e i (a)) + (a j e j (a)) = 0. Also, from equation (2) we know that each …rm will choose a level of emissions to equate their marginal abatement cost with the permit price, it follows that @c i @ei @e i @p @p @a @a @a k = p @e i @p @p @a @a @a k and @c j @ej @e j @p @p @a @a @a k = p @e j @p @p @a @a @a k for k = i; j. Therefore equating (12) and (13) to zero for the optimum and simplifying, we obtain: 4 p @D i @a @a @a i @D j @a @a @a i = 0
p @D i @a @a @a j @D j @a @a @a j = 0
From equations (14) and (15), it is clear that for social optimality to occur, regulator k's domestic emissions cap must be chosen so that the cost of emissions (the permit price) is equal to the sum of regulators'marginal damages. In other words, each regulator considers the marginal damage on both regulators when selecting a domestic emissions cap.
To investigate aggregate emissions, we sum (14) and (15) together and rearrange: 2p = @D i @a @a @a i + @a @a j + @D j @a @a @a i + @a @a j
Equation (16) shows, for the market, that at the socially optimal level of aggregate allocation, the aggregate marginal bene…t of allocation (the permit price) equals the sum of regulators' aggregate marginal damages of allocation (that is, each regulators marginal damage caused by both a i and a j ). 5 As the central planner selects a i and a j simultaneously, the aggregate emissions cap is a = a i + a j and it follows that @a @a k = 1 for k = i; j. For ease of comparison throughout the paper, equation (16) can be further simpli…ed to:
Equation (17) shows that, for the market as a whole, the social optimum level of aggregate emissions occurs when the aggregate emissions cap is chosen so that the sum of regulators' aggregate marginal damages (for the aggregate emissions cap) equals the permit price.
We proceed by investigating the a¤ects of the sequential announcement of permit allocations by regulators.
Sequential Announcement of Permit Allocations
In this section we start by examining the optimal allocation choice of the follower and, given this, work out the optimal strategy for the leader.
The follower, regulator j, takes the other regulator's domestic cap a i as given.
Therefore, substituting equation (8) into (7) and di¤erentiating with respect to a j gives regulator j's reaction function:
@p @a (a j e j (a)) + p @D j (a) @a = 0
where p = @c k (e k ) @e k for k = i; j, from (2). The follower will choose an opti-mal level of allocation a j so that (18) holds. Next, we solve the leader's problem.
Regulator i, the leader, understands that the follower will react to its allocation announcement. Substituting equation (9) into (7) and di¤erentiating with respect to a i gives: @p @a (a i e i (a)) 1 + @a j @a i + p 1 @e @p @p @a 1 + @a j @a i
@c @e @e @p @p @a 1 + @a j @a i @D i (a) @a 1 + @a j @a i
Noting equation (2), it follows that p @e @p @p @a 1 + @a j @a i @c @e @e @p @p @a 1 + @a j @a i = 0. Therefore, at the optimum, equation (19) can be reduced to:
@p @a (a i e i (a)) 1 + @a j @a i + p @D i (a) @a 1 + @a j @a i = 0 (20)
Assuming that h 1 + @a j @a i i , this can be easily expressed as: 6 @p @a (a i e i (a)) + p @D i (a) @a = 0
The leader will choose an optimal level of allocation a i so that (21) holds. Comparing (18) and (21), both reaction functions are similar in that three in ‡uences a¤ect the choice of allocation (Helm 2003) . Increasing allocation increases regulators'marginal damages. Second, each regulator bene…ts from the additional payo¤ it receives from increasing allocation, that is, the regulator obtains the value of the permit price for each new permit chosen (p ) by either selling the additional unit or reducing the amount demanded by the additional unit. Lastly, increasing the permit allocation 6 The second order conditions for the solution hold for the follower when: @ 2 p @a 2 (a j e j (a)) @ 2 cj (ej ) @e 2 j @e j @p @p @a 2 @ 2 Dj (a) @a 2 < 0 and for the leader when: (a i e i (a)) @ 2 p @a 2 @a @ai 2 + @p @a @ 2 a @a 2 i + 2 @p @a @a @ai @e i @p h @p @a @a @ai i 2 @ 2 Di(a) @a 2 @a @ai 2 @Di(a) @a @ 2 a @a 2 i < 0. In general terms, optimality occurs when @ 2 p @a 2 , @ 2 a @a 2 i are relatively small and @ 2 c(e k ) @e 2 k is relatively large. In the following we assume that the optimality of the second order conditions holds. will increase the aggregate supply of permits. Therefore, an increase in allocation will reduce the permit price received for each additional permit bought or sold by @p @a , which from (6), is negative.
The main di¤erence between the two reaction functions arises as the leader has additional information about the reaction of the follower ( ). From (21), it is clear that , the conjectural derivative, will alter the leader's choice of allocation compared to that of the follower (Friedman 1983) . Summing equations (18) and (21) together and rearranging, we obtain one of our main results:
Proposition 1 When regulators sequentially determine their domestic emissions caps then the aggregate emissions cap in the market equilibrium occurs when:
where = h 1 + @a j @a i i , regulator i (the leader) chooses a domestic cap from (21) and regulator j (the follower) chooses a domestic cap from (18).
Proposition 1 presents an expression which relates regulators'aggregate marginal
damages with the permit price (given an aggregate emissions cap). From equation (22) it is immediate that 1+ 6 = 1, 8 . It follows by comparing (17) and (22) that the aggregate emissions in the market equilibrium will never reach the socially optimal level of aggregate emissions. Both regulators do not take into consideration the a¤ect of their permit allocation on the other regulator's damage function and, as the result, aggregate emissions are larger than the socially optimal level. We return to this in the following section.
As with any Stackelberg (leader-follower) model, the leader's knowledge of whether the follower selects allocation as a substitute or complement is crucial to the level of allocation chosen. When < 1, the follower's allocation choice is negatively related to the choice made by the leader-the follower's choice of domestic allocation is a substitute. We denote two types of substitute: "weak" and "strong" substitutes.
For "weak" substitutes the follower's response is relatively insensitive ( 2 (0; 1)) and for "strong" substitutes the reaction is relatively sensitive ( 2 ( 1; 1) ).
Further, when > 1, the follower's choice of allocation is a complement (i.e. the follower increases allocation when the leader increases allocation).
To what extent the choice of allocations are substitutes or complements depends on the functional forms placed on …rms' abatement costs and regulators' damage functions. Bárcena-Ruiz (2006) and Kennedy (1994) have shown that, for the case of environmental taxes, the selection of substitutes or complements depends on the extent to which pollution "spillovers" to the other regulator, that is, to what extent the pollutant is transboundary. A similar logic applies here: parameters in the functional form of the abatement cost and damage functions will determine the characteristics of allocation choice. However, we abstract from the causes of what determines allocation choices to be substitutes or complements, and instead focus on the optimal behaviour and social optimality of the permit market when the characteristics of allocation choices have been ex-ante determined. From equation (22), it is immediate that a special case exists when = 1.
Special Case: Cournot-Nash Game = 1
Assume that h 1 + @a j @a i i = 1, where the conjectural derivative is zero, @a j @a i = 0. In this game, the leader takes as given, the follower's level of allocation. This means that both regulators simultaneously announce allocations given the others'choice of allocation so that both are followers-a Cournot-Nash game. This can be seen more clearly by substituting = 1 into equations (21) and (22) and summing so that:
Corollary 2 When = 1, regulators k = i; j simultaneously announce permit allocations so that their reaction functions are @p @a (a k e k (a)) + p @D k (a) @a = 0 (23) and the aggregate emissions cap, at the market equilibrium, occurs when p = 1 2 @D i (a) @a + @D j (a) @a (24)
This is in line with Helm (2003) and D'Amato and Valentini (2006) . Comparing equation (17) with (24) shows that when domestic caps are chosen simultaneously, the socially optimal level of allocation (emissions) is not achieved. It follows that decentralising the allocation process to separate regulators actually increases the aggregate level of emissions relative to the socially optimal level of emissions. Similar to the sequential game, this occurs as regulator k does not take into consideration the a¤ect of it's emissions on the other regulator's damage function.
Sequential vs. Simultaneous Announcement of

Permit Allocations
In this section, we directly compare the social optimality of simultaneously and sequentially announcing domestic emissions caps. Furthermore, we show that allowing the sequential announcements of domestic emissions caps can signi…cantly alter whether the leader decides to be a permit buyer or seller.
Comparing the socially optimal level of allocation (17) with the levels for the simultaneous (22) and sequential (24) games, shows that as 1+ 6 = 1 8 , allowing regulators the option to determine their own domestic permit cap, either sequentially or simultaneously, is socially sub-optimal.
This can be seen clearly by mapping 1+ for all possible combinations of @a j @a i . 7 Figure 1 shows the values of the asymptotic hyperbola 1+ when the reaction of the follower changes (i.e. @a j @a i changes). From Figure 1 , the socially optimal allocation occurs when 1+ = 1 and due to the assumption that
values of 1+ less than 1 represent a larger allocation than the socially optimal level.
Further, as shown above, the simultaneous announcement of allocations, @a j @a i = 0, is 1+ = 1 2 . First, consider the case of complementarily allocation choice @a j @a i > 0. As can be seen from Figure 1 , if complementarily exists, the sequential cap will be larger than the socially optimal level but smaller than the cap chosen in the simultaneous game.
As @a j @a i ! 1, one observes an aggregate emissions cap converging to the socially optimal level. Given the leader understands the follower acts in a complementarily fashion, any increase in the leader's allocation will result in an increase in allocation from the follower which will further depreciate the permit price. Therefore, the leader may consider reducing allocation in order to prevent a dramatic fall in the equilibrium permit price. The degree to which this happens depends on the sensitivity of both the price change (given by (6)) and the follower's reaction. Second, assume the follower announces allocation as a "weak" substitute @a j @a i 2 ( 1; 0). From Figure 1 , it can be seen that the aggregate allocation is larger than the socially optimal level and the simultaneous game. Intuitively, the follower's reaction does not outweigh an increase in the leader's allocation and, as a consequence, aggregate emissions increase. Again, the degree to which aggregate allocation changes us assume that the follower reacts with "strong" substitutability @a j @a i < 2. Figure 2 represents the remaining branch of the hyperbola of 1+ for @a j @a i < 2. From Figure  2 , the aggregate emissions cap is lower than the level observed in the socially optimal benchmark ( 1+ is above 1) and the simultaneous game. However, when @a j @a i ! 1 the aggregate emissions cap converges towards the socially optimal level. Intuitively, as the leader increases its allocation, the follower reduces allocation proportionally, to such an extent, that the aggregate level of emissions is now lower than socially optimal.
In summary we have:
Proposition 3 If domestic emissions caps are chosen sequentially, then:
When @a j @a i > 0 the aggregate cap is larger than the socially optimal level and smaller than the simultaneous allocation.
When @a j @a i = 0 the aggregate cap is larger than the socially optimal level and is identical to the simultaneous allocation.
When @a j @a i 2 ( 1; 0) the aggregate cap is larger than the socially optimal level and the simultaneous allocation. When @a j @a i < 2 the aggregate cap is smaller than the socially optimal level and the simultaneous allocation.
For the rest of the paper, we focus on the most realistic scenario where > 0. That is, to make comparisons between the simultaneous and sequential games, we focus on scenarios where the follower's reaction is either a complement or a "weak" substitute and simply refer to them as complements and substitutes. From Proposition 3, then, we consider the scenario where aggregate allocation is larger than the socially optimal level.
To further compare the results of simultaneous and sequential allocation, we follow Helm (2003) by denoting "low damage" regulators when the regulator experiences p > @D k (a) @a and "high damage" regulators when p < @D k (a) @a . Given we know @p @a < 0 from equation (6), it follows from equation (23) that in equilibrium,"low damage" regulators must be net sellers of permits and "high damage" regulators must be net buyers of permits. Intuitively, if "high damage" regulators increased their allocation, their damages would increase more than the payo¤ they would receive from doing so. Therefore they prefer to be net buyers of permits. Conversely, "low damage" regulators receive a higher price than their damage for each unit of allocation chosen, so would prefer to increase allocation and be a net seller of permits.
An interesting result occurs when we investigate the consequences of switching between a simultaneous game and a sequential game. In a sequential allocation game the leader can adapt it's allocation choice in full knowledge of the reaction of the follower. In fact, in certain circumstances the leader may completely alter it's behaviour between the simultaneous and sequential games. For > 0, comparing (21) with = 1 and 6 = 1 reveals that a regulator in a simultaneous game that switches to become a leader in a sequential game may have an incentive to alter its use of permits so that it changes from a net seller (buyer) to net buyer (seller). We …nd that:
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Corollary 4 If a regulator changes from a simultaneous to a leader in a sequential allocation then:
(i) For 2 (1; 1), 9 where 8 such that p > @D i (a) @a and p < @D i (a) @a and (ii) For 2 (0; 1), 9 where 8 2 (0; ] such that p < @D i (a) @a and p > @D i (a) @a
Corollary (4) shows that, due to the additional information about the reaction of the follower, it is possible for net sellers (buyers) in the simultaneous allocation game to choose to become net buyers (sellers) in the sequential game. The intuition is clear. In case (i) the regulator is initially a net seller of permits then moves …rst to become the leader in the sequential game. If the follower in the sequential game chooses allocation in a complementarily fashion, then the follower will react to any increase in the leader's permit allocation by increasing it's own allocation which has the result of depreciating the permit price. Indeed as shown in Corollary (4) case (i), there will be a threshold value of the follower's reaction ( ) which will depreciate the price to such an extent that the leader actually chooses to become a net buyer of permits. In case (ii), a net buyer in the simultaneous game, moves …rst in a sequential game and we assume the follower in the sequential game chooses allocation as a substitute. For the leader, a threshold value of exists in which the substitution of permits is so low that, the price of permits becomes "too expensive"
to buy permits and the leader switches to become a net supplier of permits instead.
Two other cases exist, (namely, p > @D i (a) @a with 2 (0; 1) and p < @D i (a) @a and > 1) for which the combination of the leaders net supply/demand of permits and the followers reaction to the leader choice actually strengthens the behaviour of the leader, so that a regulator that becomes leader continues to be a net seller (buyer).
The choice of whether the leader decides to become a net buyer or seller of permits and consequently whether the follower will be a net supplier or buyer of permits, can also be viewed through the leader's marginal damage relative to the followers. This can be seen by subtracting (18) from (21) which gives: @p @a (a i e i (a) a j + e j (a)) + p 1 = @D i (a) @a @D j (a) @a (25) Noting that, in equilibrium, a i e i (a) = a j + e j (a) and denoting @p @a = p 0 equation (25) becomes:
From equation (26) we have the following Proposition:
Proposition 5 If @D i (a) @a > @D j (a) @a then the leader announces an allocation so that: when 2 (0; 1) either (i) a i < e i or (ii) a i > e i such that 2p 0 (a i e i (a)) < p 1 when > 1 then a i < e i such that 2p 0 (a i e i (a)) > p 1
If @D i (a) @a < @D j (a) @a then the leader announces an allocation so that when 2 (0; 1) then a i > e i such that 2p 0 (a i e i (a)) > p 1 when > 1 then either (i) a i > e i or (ii) a i < e i such that 2p 0 (a i e i (a)) < p 1
Proposition (5) shows that not only does the leader choose to be a net supplier/ demander based on its relative marginal damage it also depends on the reaction of the follower. When @D i (a) @a > @D j (a) @a , it is intuitive that the leader, which has larger marginal damage, would aim to be a net buyer of permits. Yet in certain circumstances, although the leader has relative higher marginal damages, it will choose to increase allocation and become a net seller of permits. When the follower chooses allocation in a substitutable fashion, it may be optimal for the leader to increase its permit allocation even when it has relatively high marginal damages. The greater the substitution of permits from the follower the larger the increase in allocation from the leader. The leader will increase allocation as long as 2p 0 (a i e i (a)) < p 1 .
Assuming that the leader has lower marginal damage than the follower @D i (a) @a < @D j (a) @a , it is feasible that the leader is a net seller of permits. Yet, when the follower selects allocation in a complementarily fashion, the leader may become a net buyer of permits. As the follower increases allocation (when the leader increase allocation), the permit price may be depreciated to such an extent that the leader becomes a net buyer of permits. The leader may choose to be a net buyer when 2p 0 (a i e i (a)) < p 1 .
This counter-intuitive result is due to the additional information the leader obtains about the follower. However, similar to D'Amato and Valentini (2006), for the special case when regulators simultaneously announce allocation caps ( = 1), the above result is simpli…ed:
Corollary 6 For = 1;
(i) If @D i (a) @a > @D j (a) @a then regulator i announces an allocation so that a i < e i (ii) If @D i (a) @a < @D j (a) @a then regulator i announces an allocation so that a i > e i When the leader takes the other regulator's choice as given, the regulator with the largest (smallest) marginal damage will always choose to be a net buyer (supplier) of permits. Therefore in the special case = 1, the counter-intuitive result no longer holds. From corollary (6), it can easily be shown that regulator j will be be a net buyer (seller) when regulator i is a net seller (buyer) based on their relative marginal damages.
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Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the consequences of sequentially announcing domestic allocation caps in an international or federal-based tradable permit market. In the …rst stage of our game, regulators sequentially announce their domestic allocation caps to their representative …rm. In stage two, their representative …rm, given this information, selects a level of emissions to pollute in the perfectly competitive tradable permit market. To the best of our knowledge, no study has investigated the consequences of allowing regulators (or governments) to sequentially announce their allocation choices. However, it is apparent from existing tradable permit markets, such as the European Emissions Trading Scheme, that sequential allocation setting is prevalent (Zapfel 2007, p 23) . The sequential setting of permit allocations may be a result, not of o¢ cially sanctioned rules or regulations in the tradable permit market, but due to heterogeneous factors that a¤ect the timing of states' permit allocation selections, such as the di¤erent e¢ ciency levels of state (government) bureaucracy. For this reason alone, it is important to understand the consequences of numerous regulators announcing domestic allocation caps at separate times.
We …nd that allowing regulators (or governments) to decide and announce their allocation cap is socially sub-optimal for sequential setting of permits (we also show this for the simultaneous case). We show that under the sequential setting of domestic emissions caps, the aggregate emissions is chosen closer too (further from) the socially optimal level when the follower's domestic allocation cap is complementary ("weakly" substitutable). In fact, the degree to which the follower changes allocation due to the leader's choice may, in certain circumstances, change the leader from being a net buyer (seller) of permits to a net seller (buyer).
Designers of tradable markets, need to be fully aware of the potential consequences of allowing regulators (or governments) to simultaneously or sequentially allocate permits. From the analysis it appears that simultaneous and sequential al-location setting will be socially sub-optimal. However, under a sequential allocation setting game, the leader may choose an allocation cap nearer the socially optimal level (compared to the simultaneous game) when the follower reacts to the leaders choice as if the allocation caps were complements.
As this appears to be the initial attempt at investigating the consequences of the sequential allocation choices, this model can be extended to include the presence of a third regulator. Many international, or federal-based tradable permit markets have "supra-governmental" agencies with power in these markets. For example, in the European Emissions Trading Scheme, the European Commission has the power to reject Member States'allocation plans. Also, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) have possible powers to in ‡uence countries. In a federal-based tradable permit market, such as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), it is feasible to consider the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) may in ‡uence the proposed allocation choice of some states.
This paper suggests that previous attempts to model the strategic behaviour of regulators in international or federal-based tradable permit markets have neglected the important issue of timing. When designing tradable permit markets, one must consider the potential consequences for social optimality when domestic allocation caps are sequentially determined.
